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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Aftermath of Miranda-
The Courts Grapple With Burden of Proof
The Miranda opinion asserted that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination attaches to pre-trial interrogations and
employs as the method of protecting this privilege the requirement
that any suspect questioned in pre-trial in-custody proceedings be
informed of four basic rights available to him at that time.' The
burden of proving that these rights were known and understood
is placed squarely and heavily upon the prosecution.' Thus if an
interrogation continues without presence of counsel and a statement
is taken, the prosecution bears the heavy burden of proving that
the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional
rights. Recalling the high stanadards of proof it has always required
for the waiver of constitutional rights, the Court in Miranda asserted
that those same standards would also be applied to in-custody inter-
rogation. Moreover, the prosecution must show that the warnings
and waiver were given in strict accordance with the Miranda re-
quirements before the admission of any statement made by the
defendant is allowed-unless it can prove it employed a fully effective
equivalent to Miranda. Furthermore, the record must show, or
there must be proof through allegation and evidence on the part
of the prosecution, that the warning was given and an intelligent
waiver was made. In addition, a waiver will not be presumed from
a silent record, a silent defendant, the eventual procurement of a
confession, or the answering of some questions followed by a re-
fusal to answer others. These principles apply not only to those
who are in custody at a police station, but also to those deprived in
any significant way of their freedom of action. If the prosecution
cannot demonstrate at trial that the warnings and waiver were
given, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be
used against the defendant.3
I Mrianda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The warnings that must be
given to insure the inviolability of the individual's right against self-incrimina-
tion prior to questioning are: 1) that he has a right to remain silent; 2) that
any statement he makes may be used against him; 3) that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney; and 4) that if he cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for him. Although these rights can be waived, this
may only be done knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
2 The rationale upon which the Court placed this burden is that: "Since
the state is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under
which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making
available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado
interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders." Id. at 475.
3 Id.
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STUDENT NOTES
This paper is a post-Miranda look at the standards courts have
employed to evaluate whether the state's burden of proof have been
satisfied. Although the results have varied, they have been largely
disappointing in the sense that no set standard has emerged by
which to judge whether the burden has been met.
The most popular position seems to be the enunciation of no
standard at all. In such a case the court does not say what proof
was offered by the prosecution to establish that the warnings were
or were not correctly given and an intelligent waiver made; instead,
the opinion merely states flatly that the record supports the finding.4
One variation of this approach is for the court to acknowledge
that its holding will alter the normal burden of proof required, add-
ing that it is not necessary to explain how.5 Another device used
is to agree that the burden is heavy, state facts which prima facie,
at any rate, raise serious doubts as to whether the state's burden
can be met, and then state simply that the burden has been met.6
A second manner of proof accepted by some courts has been
simply the testimony of the interrogator that the warnings were
given and that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
them.7 Here again, it is difficult to ascertain whether any other
evidence was offered by the state-the opinion simply relates that
the interrogator so testified and the factual situation presented
4Cook v. United States, 392 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Hodge
v. United States, 392 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Follette,
393 F.2d 879 (2nd Cir. 1968); Griffith v. State, 116 Ga. App. 429, 157 S.E.2d
894 (1967); State v. McDaniel, 272 N.C. 556, 158 S.E.2d 874 (1967);
Kramer v. Washington, 43 P.2d 970 (Wash. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
833 (1968).
5 Cf. United States v. Adams, 37 U.S.L.W. 2303 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19,
1968). Here the court struck down part of a statute which provided that a
person arrested for possession of marijuana was presumed to know it was
imported unless he proved otherwise. Acknowledging that a departure from
the proofs normally required would follow from its decision, the court added,
"It is not useful to predict or speculate as to the form such evidence may or
should take. It is sufficient for now to hold, and the court does, that in the
absence of such independent evidence, the prosecution will have failed to
make out a case for the jury." Id.6 Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968). Here the
court stated that the defendant was a 35 year old Negro with a third or
fourth grade education and a limited capacity to read or write. The defendant
testified that he could not read and that he did not understand what the
waiver meant. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the hearing was
thorough and the trial judge was in a position to observe the defendant
and rule on his ability to comprehend. Similarly the court was able to rise
above issues concerning the failure of a second warning to be given when
the defendant was taken to another city for re-questioning and the result
of a delay in arraignment.
7 Parish v. State, 117 Ga. App. 616, 618, 161 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1968).
Here it was referred to as the "uncontradicted testimony of the witness."
19691
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speaks of no other method of proof being offered. Thus one must
assume that the court relied solely on the interrogator's testimony.8
Courts have also accepted the testimony of the interrogator together
with the admission into evidence of a card with the four warnings
printed upon it that has been signed by the accused." Within this
category, too, fall cases where the interrogator states that the warn-
ings were given and the defendant denies that this was done-the
outcome of such "swearing contests" is generally left to the dis-
cretion of the trial court. 10
There are also cases which approach the problem from the
negative," decide that Miranda is not applicable for anyone of a
variety of reasons,'" or state or imply that the defendant shares in
the burden of proof. 3
8id.
9 Fritts v. United States, 395 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968); Menendez v.
United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1968).
11 Green v. State, 223 Ga. 611, 157 S.E.2d 257 (1967); State v. Clyburn,
273 N.C. 284, 159 S.E.2d 868 (1968).
1 'These courts decide the cases on the basis of what was not done
rather than on what took place. For example, in Johnson v. Commonwealth,
160 S.E.2d 793, 798 (Va. 1968), the court stated that the government's case
overlooked the trial court's finding that the defendant had been "taken into
custody," the fact that after the defendant was first questioned and released he
was told "not to leave the house," and the fact that during two of the
questioning periods the defendant was not permitted to see his mother
although she requested a visit. This amounted to such pretrial custody that
the Miranda warnings had to be given.
12State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 335, 158 S.E.2d 638, 645 (1968).
This case held that Miranda was not applicable because the police were en-
gaged in a general investigation of whether a crime had been committed,
and if so, by whom. This was the holding despite the following statement
by the court on the issue of whether the defendant was at that time a suspect:
"The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that the
defendant was then suspected, indeed it was manifest, that he, on his own
premises, had shot Newman." State v. Ross, 273 N.C. 498, 160 S.E.2d 465
(1968). No statement made by defendant was used against him at the trial,
so it became immaterial whether he made a waiver or not; State v. Craddock,
272 N.C. 160, 158 S.E.2d 25 (1967). The court in this case observed that
Miranda does not prohibit the mere asking for consent to search a car,
although this occurred at 4:30 A.M. and two policemen followed defendants'
car, radioed for help, set up a roadblock to stop them, approached their car
with drawn pistols, and had the defendants get out of their car and be
searched for weapons before the request to search was made. Wilson v.
Bailey, 375 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1967). Here the defendant was questioned in
a hospital after having his stomach pumped from taking poison. The court
reasoned that Miranda did not apply because the record showed: 1) that
suspicion was not focused on the defendant at that time, 2) there was a
doctor present, 3) the defendant was not in custody, 4) there were no threats
or physical or psychological coercion, and 5) it did not appear that he was
so ill as not to be conscious of his answers.
13 Griffith v. State, 116 Ga. App. 429, 431, 157 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1967),
held that a
confession is admissible, prima facie, in the absence of some claim or
contention by the defendant on trial that he was indigent at the time
3
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STUDENT NOTES
Rare indeed are the courts that explain what will satisfy the
burden of proof requirement. In one such instance a court, hold-
ing that the accused's rights were not violated, noted that the re-
cord showed that the defendant had been warned of his rights
but agreed to talk. Later he requested an attorney, had one im-
mediately appointed, was not questioned for several days following
this appointment and was then interrogated in the presence of his
attorney. 4 In another case an appellate court, hearing an appeal
involving a suppression motion, directed the district court to furnish
the following facts: findings as to whether warnings of constitutional
rights were given, and if so, time, maker and contents of each
such warning; all statements of and to the defendant considered
pertinent to a suppression ruling; whether the defendant requested
counsel, and if so, time and content of each such request and to
whom made; and finally, the findings should be stated in the se-
quence and context in which they occurred.' 5 Another court, while
reversing on the ground that the warning of right to counsel was
not expressly stated to the defendant, also enumerated other de-
ficiencies in the state's evidence. 6
This survey of recent cases illustrates the paucity of standards
set out by the courts to determine whether the Miranda burden
of proof requirements have been followed. Moreover, the problem
becomes more serious as new issues, not resolved by Miranda, con-
tinue to emanate from that decision. Collateral questions now being
raised include: the effect to be given statements made in a second
interrogation which followed a tainted one;' 7 whether the state
should bear the burden of proving whether alleged omissions and
of the interrogation, thus effectively relieving the state of the burden of
showing either a) that the prisoner, at the time of the interrogation,
was known to have an attorney or was known to have ample funds to
secure one or b) showing that the prisoner was told that if he was
indigent an attorney would be secured for him.
For similar implications see Wilson v. Bailey, 375 F.2d 663 (4th Cir.
1967); State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968).
,4 Boeckenhaupt v. United States, 392 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1968).
' Camacho v. United States, 392 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1968).
'
6 Sykes v. United States, 392 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1968). Among other
things, an illegal search produced, in the absence of the requisite warnings,
incriminating statements from a defendant who was unable to understand
English and who acknowledged "understanding" of her rights by nodding her
head.
17Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966). The court
held that a presumption would arise that the influences invalidating the first
would carry over to the second, leaving it up to the prosecution to prove
that these influences were dissipated.
1969]
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failures by defendant's attorney were non-prejudicial; 8 the con-
stitutionality of imposing a longer sentence after a second conviction
when the original conviction was reversed for an erroneously ad-
mitted confession;' 9 the prosecutor's comment on the failure of a
defendant to deny involvement in two of the four robberies of
which he was accused after he took the stand to deny the other
two;2 ° the right to counsel during a psychiatric interview given
because the defendant planned to plead insanity;2' application of
the Miranda safeguards, after a pre-Miranda first trial, to a post-
Miranda second trial;22 right to counsel at a line-up;23 and the right
to counsel when the accused is taken, before arrest, to a confronta-
tion with the victim for identification purposes.24
Since all of these situations are also predicated largely on
burden of proof considerations, it becomes even more imperative
to find a clear-cut test to determine whether the burden has been
met. Practical suggestions on how to effectuate the warnings re-
quired by Miranda have not been lacking. The American Law
Institute suggests that waivers must be made before the custody
magistrate. This would not only help to insure that the accused
understood fully what he was doing, but would also do away with
the confusing "voluntariness" test often used by courts to decide the
admissibility of a confession.2" One writer has also suggested, among
other things, transcribed verbatim interrogation sessions, the use
of comprehensive tape or wire recordings, and as it becomes more
economically feasible, the use of video tapes and motion pictures
to record the interrogation.26
18 Peyton v. Coles, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
849 (1968).
19 North Carolina v. Pearce, 393 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. granted,
393 U.S. 922 (1968). For a comment on this issue see 70 W. VA. L. REv.
121 (1968).
20 Perez v. California, 65 Cal. 2d 615, 422 P.2d 597, 55 Cal. Rptr. 909
(1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 853 (1968).21 United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968).22 Scott v. United States, 392 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1968); State v. Branch,
1 N.C. App. 279, 161 S.E.2d 492 (1968). The first case applied Miranda,
the second did not.
23 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1966); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1966).2 4 Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).25
ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1966). The
test referred to is found in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43
(1897). Whenever the question of the voluntariness of the confession arises,
it is controlled by the fifth amendment and the test is "whether the confession
was free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influences. .. ."2 6 D. PENOFSKY, GUIDELINES FOR ]NTERROGATIONS--WAIVER OF RIGHTS
UNDER MIRANDA (1967).
[Vol. 71
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STUDENT NOTES
Perhaps, however, the problem is more a philosophical one.
It is suggested that a large part of the confusion results from an
unclear concept of what the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination really entails. There are diverse opinions as to how
and even whether the right should attach to pre-trial, in-custody
interrogations." Until some sort of unity is reached on this basic
tenet, it is probable that no one standard can be established.
An accusatory legal system where one's innocence is presumed
until guilt is proven runs contrary to the use of a man's own
statements to convict him. It is up to the state to prove guilt. Thus
the state must also prove that in obtaining its evidence it violated
none of the rights of the defendant. With regard to fifth amendment
rights, the state must prove, in order to offer the defendant's state-
ments into evidence, that they were made at a time when the
defendant was in danger of incriminating himself and that he was
aware of this danger.
If the state sought to avoid the applicability of these standards
by saying there was no threat, it would have to prove in effect that
the statement was in no way incriminating. In the absence of such
a showing, Miranda would apply. The government would then be
27 Compare Miranda's unequivocal statement that the privilege does apply
at this stage of the proceedings to the following:
The question is now being increasingly asked whether the full scope
of the privilege, as recently construed and enlarged, is justified either
by its long and tangled history or by any genuine need in a criminal
trial. There is agreement, of course, that the privilege must always be
preserved in fullest measure against inquisitions into political or religious
beliefs or conduct. Indeed, the historic origin and purpose of the privilege
was primarily to protect against the evil of governmental suppression of
ideas. But it is doubtful that when the Fifth Amendment was adopted
it was conceived that its major beneficiaries would be those accused of
crimes against person and property.
PRESIDEuNT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). (Separate
statement concurred in by seven of the nineteen members of the commission).
The New Jersey Supreme Court was even stronger in its criticism.
Voluntary confessions accord with high moral values, and as to the
culprit who reveals his guilt unwittingly with no intent to shed his
inner burden, it is no more unfair to use the evidence he thereby reveals
than it is to turn against him clues at the scene of the crime which a
brighter, better informed, or more gifted criminal would not have left.
Thus the Fifth Amendment does not say that a man shall not be permitted
to incriminate himself, or that he shall not be persuaded to do so.
It says no more than that a man shall not be "compelled" to give
evidence against himself. ... It is consonant with good morals, and the
Constitution, to exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity in the de-
tectional process. This must be so if Government is to succeed in its
primary mission to protect the first right of the individual to live free
from criminal attack." State v. McKnight, 37 U.S.L.W. 2020 (1968).
1969]
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under a burden of showing that the individual was mentally capable
of understanding his situation, that he was aware that he was a
suspect, that he knew the nature of the crime involved and its
punishment, that he was aware of the defenses to this crime, and
that he knew what rights were available to him. Obviously, the
fulfillment of such a burden of proof would require more than the
reading of rights from a card which the defendant then signs. How-
ever, the defendant's awareness of his rights could easily be assured
by the presence of counsel. Since it is difficult to conceive of a
situation where one would elect to waive the benefit of counsel,
the placing of this heavy a burden of proof on the prosecution-to
show that the Miranda requirements have been complied with-
is seemingly justified. Thus, the fulfillment of this burden would
tend to show that any waiver given was knowingly and intelligently
made.
Linda L. Hupp
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